The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 by Friedman, Howard M.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 68 | Number 3 Article 2
3-1-1990
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988
Howard M. Friedman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 465 (1990).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol68/iss3/2
THE INSIDER TRADING AND SECURITIES
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1988
HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN t
In enacting the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act ("ITSFEA', Congress added another weapon to the Securities and
Exchange Commission's arsenal used to combat insider trading. The
Act made a number of changes to the law, but perhaps more impor-
tantly, ITSFEA seems to have effected a number of less-than-obvious
changes to insider trading law. In this Article Professor Howard Fried-
man summarizes the Act's major provisions. In addition, the author
analyzes the pre-existing state of insider trading law and ITSFEA 's leg-
islative history to highlight the importance of the Act's hidden changes to
insider trading jurisprudence.
On November 19, 1988, the President signed the Insider Trading and Se-
curities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA"). 1 The Act made a
number of obvious changes in the law. In addition, and perhaps as importantly,
it may have effected a number of less-than-obvious changes through provisions
whose impact lay buried in language that assumes significance only upon a close
examination of the Act's legislative history and of the pre-existing state of in-
sider trading jurisprudence. The most significant of these hidden changes in the
law were provisions that arguably resulted in (1) validation of theSecurities and
Exchange Commission's ("SEC") rule 14e-3, which prohibits one from trading
while in the possession of material undisclosed information about an upcoming
tender offer; (2) solving the conundrum of "transactional causation" in insider
trading cases; and (3) creating the basis for applying a uniform five-year statute
of limitations to all rule lOb-5 claims.
This Article chronicles the background of ITSFEA, summarizes the Act's
major provisions, and analyzes the hidden changes in law made by some of those
provisions.
I. THE CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF ITSFEA
A. The New "Insider" Trading Problem
The general problem of insider trading is hardly new. Insider trading holds
great potential for profit, and most often occurs when the inside information
involves unexpected events crucial to assessing a company's value. In these
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1. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988
Supp.)). For a discussion of the proposals leading to the enactment of ITSFEA, see Aldave, The
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988: An Analysis and Appraisal, 52 ALB.
L. REV. 893, 893-905 (1988).
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cases, the market has not adjusted stock prices in anticipation of the develop-
ment so that large price movements can be expected upon public disclosure.
2
As early as 1914 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) amended its list-
ing agreement to require prompt disclosure by listed companies of actions relat-
ing to dividends and interest.3 The amendment represented the NYSE's
reaction to stock price distortions and the potential for insider trading caused by
Goodrich Rubber Co.'s failure to disclose the declaration of a dividend that was
to be payable several months after its declaration. 4 Twenty years later, in Sec-
tion 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,5 Congress directly dealt with
some of the dangers from insider trading by permitting recovery on behalf of the
issuer for profits realized from a pair of transactions conducted within six
months of each other by specified insiders. 6 As the Senate Committee Report on
the 1982 Act stated:
The bill further aims to protect the interests of the public by
preventing directors, officers, and principal stockholders of a corpora-
tion, the stock of which is traded in on exchanges, from speculating in
the stock on the basis of information not available to others.... Such
a provision [Section 16] will render difficult or impossible the kind of
transactions which were frequently described to the committee, where
directors and large stockholders participated in pools trading in the
stock of their own companies, with the benefit of advance information
regarding an increase or resumption of dividends in some cases, and
the passing of dividends in others.
7
Because much insider trading fell outside the proscription of Section 16,8
however, SEC rule lOb-5 9 became the predominant tool for use against tradi-
2. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549 (1984) (discussing effects of the distribution of information on market efficiency).
3. See Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PRoBs. 518, 524 (1952).
4. Id. For the current NYSE requirements for listed companies in this regard, see NYSE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 202.05 - .06 (1983).
5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404 § 16, 48 Stat. 881, 886-87 (1934) (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982)). See generally A. JACOBs, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIEs EXCHANGE
ACT (1989) (comprehensive discussion of Section 16).
6. Section 16 covers short-swing transactions by directors, officers, and persons beneficially
owning more than 10% of a class of equity securities of an issuer that is registered pursuant to § 12
of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982).
7. S. REP. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
8. Much insider trading involves a span of more than six months between the purchase and
sale or sale and purchase. Some insider trading is undertaken by employees and other insiders, or by
tippees, who are not officers, directors or over-10% shareholders. Some insider trading involves
securities of an issuer that is sufficiently small or closely held that it is not required to register under
§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act.
9. Rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances tinder
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
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tional insider trading. In its decision in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 10 the SEC
held that insider trading on unreleased news of a dividend cut by persons in a
special relationship with the company and privy to its internal affairs amounted
to a practice that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers, in violation of rule
lOb-5, clause (3).11
Initially, the typical insider trading case involved advance knowledge of
dividend 12 or earnings 13 changes, or undisclosed information about assets14 or
operations 5 of the issuer. 16 However, with the rise of hostile cash tender offers
made at large premiums over current market, 17 advance information about up-
coming tender offers became a prime source of insiders' profits. 18 Advance in-
formation about tender offers involved two new and different elements from
traditional insider trading cases that made it difficult for courts to find violations
of rule lOb-5.
First, information about tender offers related not to information about busi-
ness developments of the issuer; rather, it was "market information," 19 that is,
information about the amount that some third party was willing to pay in the
market for the issuer's stock. Second, the information often came not from the
issuer or its officers or directors, but rather from the third party who was con-
templating the making of the tender offer. Thus, individuals were profiting from
the use of material undisclosed information, but not from information that be-
longed to the issuer whose shares were being traded as in the case of traditional
insider trading. The notion of insider trading as a kind of misappropriation of
corporate assets20 thus could not be superimposed on this sort of transaction.
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989).
10. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
11. Id. at 913.
12. Id.
13. E.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 495 F.2d 228, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Ward LaFrance
Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 374-78 (1943).
14. E.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1968), cerL denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
15. Eg., State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 846-48 (2d Cir. 1981).
16. See 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7.4
(200)-(219) (1988) (discussion of numerous traditional insider trading cases). The rich, but publicly
unanticipated, mineral find involved in the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation presents a para-
digm for insider trading because of the magnitude of the unanticipated inside information involved.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
17. See TENDER OFFERS, DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARIES 10-11 (1985); M. SALTER &
W. WEINHOLD, MERGER TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980's (1980).
18. See GAO Says More Precise Definition of Insider Trading May Be Necessary, 20 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1475 (1988).
19. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 810-12 (1973).
20. See, eg., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503-04, 248 N.E.2d 910, 915-16, 301
N.Y.S.2d 78, 85-86 (1969) (common-law treatment of insider trading as misappropriation of corpo-
rate asset).
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Instead, other notions of wrongfulness were required in order to bring this type
of trading within the ambit of rule lOb-5.
B. The Supreme Court's Reshaping of the Law
Courts facing the problem of market information originating with third
parties had difficulty bringing the cases within the traditional conception of "in-
sider trading" under rule lOb-5. Insider trading involves not affirmative mis-
statements or half truths; rather, it involves market participants remaining
totally silent about material information. If silence amounts to an act or prac-
tice that operates as a fraud, it is because the defendant had a duty to speak.2 1
Courts could easily find such a duty when the insider trading on nonpublic in-
formation was an officer or director of the issuer.22 Courts were also willing to
find that one class of outsiders-tippees of insiders-violated rule lOb-5 by aid-
ing in the insider's breach of duty.2 3 But courts refused to impose a duty on all
outsiders to disclose material information 24 before they traded.25 The expan-
sion of disclosure obligations under rule lOb-5 to large classes of outsiders was
accomplished only through the development of the misappropriation theory.
Theories, such as the one describing insider trading, have their own inexo-
rable internal logic. For example, once tippees were found to be in violation of
insider trading proscriptions solely by reason of their abetting an insider's
breach of duty, it became clear that some traders might obtain information from
insiders other than through the insider's breach of duty. In such cases, logic
compelled that the trader could freely take advantage of the publicly undisclosed
information in the same way as information lawfully obtained from third par-
ties.2 6 Justice Holmes' aphorism that "the life of the law has not been logic: it
has been experience" 27 is as applicable, however, to the regulation of securities
fraud as it is to the common law more generally. The perceived unfairness of
trading, even by outsiders, on at least certain kinds of undisclosed material infor-
mation led the SEC to seek an alternative theory for imposing sanctions upon
those who used wrongfully obtained information for personal profit. As dis-
cussed below, 28 the availability of that theory-commonly called the misappro-
priation theory-was ultimately confirmed by judicial and legislative action,
albeit without broad justification for drawing the lines where they were drawn.
The Supreme Court first faced the issue of nontippee "outsider" trading on
21. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 230 n.12.
24. Id. at 227-37. For a discussion of the Chiarella case, see infra text accompanying notes 29-
38.
25. While this rule might lead to some financial unfairness, one theory suggests that the strong
policy of encouraging the search for corporate and economic information which will make securities
markets more efficient justifies the costs of the rule. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 339-43 (1979).
26. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665-67 (1983).
27. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
28. For a discussion of the misappropriation theory, see infra notes 53-64 and accompanying
text.
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material, undisclosed information in Chiarella v. United States.29 Vincent
Chiarella, the defendant whom the trial court criminally convicted, worked in
the composing room of a New York financial printer as a "markup man."'30 He
obtained the names of target companies in upcoming tender offers from the bid-
ders' announcements that he handled and purchased stock in those targets
before the offers were publicly announced. 3 1 He made slightly more than
$30,000 in profits by reselling these shares upon public announcement of the
tender offers.32 The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that
Chiarella had no duty to disclose information that he knew before trading in the
market.3 3 Silence, the Court held, amounts to fraud only if there is a duty to
speak.
34
Chiarella made clear that rule lOb-5 did not apply merely because a buyer
or seller obtained an unfair advantage over less informed buyers or sellers
through his use of undisclosed material information. 35 Absent a duty to dis-
close, which is imposed upon corporate insiders because of their fiduciary duties
to shareholders,3 6 informational imbalances in the marketplace will be tolerated.
However, one group of outsiders, tippees of corporate insiders, will violate rule
10b-5 when they trade. These outsiders participate after the fact in the insider's
breach of duty when they profit by the use of inside information that they know
is confidential and that they know or should know came from a corporate
insider.
37
Chiarella laid to rest once and for all the notion that rule lOb-5 requires a
level playing field for all investors. The Court declared that "neither the Con-
gress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule."'38
Three years later the Supreme Court pursued the logic of that conclusion by
holding in Dirks v. SEC3 9 that outsiders may use even some undisclosed mate-
rial information obtained from insiders without violating rule lOb-5.
40
If ever it were true that "hard cases make bad law," Dirks would be the case
to make the point. Raymond Dirks, an officer of a broker-dealer firm, special-
ized in providing investment analysis of insurance company securities. 41 A for-
mer officer of Equity Funding informed Dirks that Equity Funding's assets were
vastly overstated as a result of massive fraud, and encouraged Dirks to verify
and disclose the fraud.42 Dirks' subsequent investigation led to corroboration
29. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
30. Id. at 224.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 230-35.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 231-35.
36. Id. at 227-30.
37. Id. at 230-35.
38" Id. at 233.
39. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
40. Id. at 664.
41. Id. at 648.
42. Id. at 649.
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of the charges from various employees of Equity Funding. Dirks urged a Wall
Street Journal reporter to write a story about the fraud, but the reporter refused,
not believing that such a massive fraud could go undetected.43 Dirks continued
his investigation, discussing it openly with a number of clients and investors, as
well as with the SEC. Some of those clients sold off their Equity Funding hold-
ings before the fraud was finally exposed publicly.44 The SEC in administrative
proceedings formally censured Dirks, claiming that he illegally tipped inside in-
formation to potential traders.45  The Supreme Court reversed that
determination.
46
In the Supreme Court's view, Dirks flowed logically from Chiarella. In de-
termining whether a tippee may trade on undisclosed information, it is necessary
to determine whether the insider's tip constituted a breach of the insider's fiduci-
ary duty.4 7 An insider breaches his duty only if he will personally benefit, either
directly or indirectly from his disclosure of information, that is, only if he re-
ceives a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings. 48 This may be shown by a relationship that suggests a quid pro quo
from the tippee, by showing an intention to benefit the particular tippee, or by
demonstrating a personal or family relationship that makes the tip and trade
resemble trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.
49
None of these elements was present in Dirks. The insiders' whistle blowing did
not benefit the insiders personally; therefore they did not breach their duty to
Equity Funding's shareholders. Absent such a breach, neither Dirks nor his
tippees could have participated in a breach of duty.50
Dirks did concede that in addition to traditional insiders, persons such as
underwriters, accountants, attorneys, or consultants may become temporary or
constructive insiders when they enter into a special confidential relationship
with an issuer and are given access to information solely for corporate pur-
poses. 51 When such a person uses that inside information for trading,'he vio-
lates rule lOb-5, and when he passes on that information, he should be treated as
a tipper, not a tippee.52
One more piece is necessary to understand the state of insider trading law at
the time of congressional enactment of ITSFEA. In Chiarella's criminal prose-
cution, the United States suggested an alternative theory of liability under rule
lOb-5 for outsiders-an approach known as the "misappropriation theory."
5 3
43. Id. at 649-50.
44. Id. at 649.
45. Id. at 650-52.
46. Id. at 667.
47. Id. at 661-62.
48. Id. at 662-63.
49. Id. at 664.
50. Id. at 661-67.
51. Id. at 655 n.14.
52. Id.
53. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-27. See generally D. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING REGU-
LATION 147-80 (1989 ed.) (discussing the misappropriation theory); Aldave, Te Misappropriation
Theory: Carpenter and its Aftermath, 49 OHio ST. L.J. 373 (1988) (reviewing the misappropriation
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The majority refused to examine the validity of the theory because, in its view,
the trial court did not submit the theory to the jury at trial.54 Chief Justice
Burger, however, disagreed and explored the theory at length in his dissenting
opinion. 55 He framed the theory succinctly:
As a general rule, neither party to an arm's length business trans-
action has an obligation to disclose information to the other unless the
parties stand in some confidential or fiduciary relation.... This rule
... provides incentive for hard work, careful analysis, and astute fore-
casting. But the policies that underlie the rule also should limit its
scope. In particular, the rule should give way when an informational
advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or indus-
try, but by some unlawful means.... [A] person who has misappropri-
ated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that
information or to refrain from trading.
5 6
The misappropriation theory fit nicely into the language of rule lOb-5 as
well. Fraud on a third person (for example, one's employer, as in Chiarella)
may be "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities. It need not be
committed against the seller or purchaser to violate rule lOb-5.
'The misappropriation theory was quickly adopted by the Second Circuit,
5 7
and the Third Circuit followed suit.58 The Second Circuit cases that had
adopted the misappropriation theory were not private damage actions; rather
the cases involved criminal prosecutions or SEC injunctive actions. When the
issue of the availability of a private action for damages based upon the misappro-
priation theory arose, the Second Circuit in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc. 59 de-
nied recovery on the ground that the duty which was breached was not a duty
that the defendant owed to the plaintiff seller of securities, but rather a duty the
defendant owed to his employer.60 ITSFEA has overturned the result of Moss.
The Supreme Court considered the validity of the misappropriation theory
in Carpenter v. United States.61 Here, a Wall Street Journal reporter used infor-
mation regarding the contents of upcoming newspaper columns for purposes of
theory in light of Supreme Court's decision in Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987));
Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpublic Information, 13
HOFSTRA L. Rv. 101 (1984) (arguing that a person commits fraud under rule lOb-5 when he mis-
appropriates nonpublic information and uses it in purchasing and selling securities); Mitchell, The
Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fair-
ness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REv. 775 (1988) (discussing the misappropriation theory).
54. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235-37.
55. Id. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
56. 445 U.S. at 239-40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); cf. Brudney, supra note 25, at 353-67, 365
(rule lOb-5 should protect against "informational advantages" that cannot be legally "overcome or
offset").
57. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985);
United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1981).
58. Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822-23 (3d Cir. 1985); see also SEC v. Clark, 699
F. Supp. 839, 845 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (adopting misappropriation theory in district court in Ninth
Circuit).
59. 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984).
60. Id. at 12-13.
61. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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tipping and trading in violation of his newspaper's confidentiality policy.62 The
Supreme Court affirmed by a four-to-four vote (and without discussion of the
merits) the defendant's conviction under the misappropriation theory, thus post-
poning to another day its definitive ruling on the theory. 63 Congress' apparent
endorsement of the misappropriation theory in ITSFEA will certainly influence
that definitive ruling, if and when it comes.
64
II. THE IMPACT OF ITSFEA
Endorsement of the misappropriation theory was not the only item on the
Congressional agenda. A wide array of proposals to clarify and expand the gov-
ernment's arsenal for combatting insider trading had been proposed in the
months prior to the enactment of ITSFEA. ITSFEA adopted a number of
these.
A. Rule 14e-3
A few months after the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella the SEC
adopted rule 14e-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.65 In the context
of tender offers the rule explicitly prohibits the kind of misappropriation of ma-
terial, nonpublic information in which Chiarella had engaged. ITSFEA appears
to have clarified lingering doubts about the validity of rule 14e-3.
66
Rule 14e-3 contains an "abstain or disclose" provision that applies when-
ever a bidder has taken substantial steps to commence, or has commenced, a
tender offer.6 7 In particular, absent public disclosure by press release or other-
wise,68 the rule prohibits trading by any person (other than the tender offeror)
who possesses material information relating to the tender offer who knows or
has reason to know both that the information is nonpublic and that it came from
the bidder, the target company, or any officer, director, partner, employee, or
other person acting on behalf of the bidder or the target company. 69 This prohi-
bition on trading is not limited to insiders and their tippees and does not turn
upon whether the information has been obtained through misappropriation.
70
62. Id. at 19.
63. Id. at 24.
64. See infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3, adopted in Exchange Act Release No. 34-17120, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCI-) 82,646 (Sept. 4, 1980).
66. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1989).
68. Rule 14e-3 requires that the disclosure of the material information come within a reason-
able time prior to the purchase or sale of the target company's shares and that it include the source
of the information. Id. § 240.14e-3
69. Under rule 14e-3, no person in possession of such information may purchase or sell, or
cause to be purchased or sold, any securities which are the subject of the tender offer (or securities
convertible into them or options to obtain or dispose of them), unless she makes the required public
disclosure first. Id.
70. In addition, rule 14e-3(d)(1) contains an antitipping provision which prohibits various per-
sons from passing on information relating to a tender offer under circumstances in which it is reason-
ably foreseeable that the tip is likely to result in a violation of the rule's disclose or abstain
provisions. Id. § 240.14e-3(d)(1).
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Commentators have raised two major questions about the validity of rule
14e-3. First is the question whether the prohibitions of the rule which apply
prior to the actual commencement of a tender offer-that is, which apply when-
ever a "substantial step or steps to commence" 71 a tender offer have been
taken-are valid. Specifically, is activity undertaken prior to the actual com-
mencement of a tender offer nevertheless "in connection with" a tender offer, as
required by Section 14(e)72 of the Securities Exchange Act?73 Some cases sug-
gest that Section 14(e) does not provide a cause of action for preoffer activities.
74
However, the one direct judicial challenge to rule 14e-3 on this ground has
failed. In O'Connor & Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 75 Federal district
court Judge Lasker stated:
While ... the scope of the Williams Act provisions is not infinitely
expandable to apply to any acts preceding a tender offer proposal, we
conclude that the conduct alleged here, insider trading on the basis of
nonpublic information that a tender offer proposal was being consid-
ered by the target board and would soon be publicly announced, are
[sic] among the ills at which the Williams Act is directed and that the
SEC accordingly had authority to prohibit such conduct under
§ 14(e).
76
The second major challenge to the validity of rule 14e-3 is whether, given
the similarity between the language of Section 14(e) and rule lOb-5, rule 14e-3
can survive the Supreme Court's Chiarella analysis which requires "the exist-
ence of a [pre-existing] fiduciary duty to disclose."' 7 7 Section 14(e) contains two
separate grants of authority to the SEC. The SEC may (1) define what are
"fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices"; and (2) "prescribe
means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and pracices. ' ' 78 This latter
prophylactic rulemaking authority presumably gives the SEC broader authority
than merely the power to define prohibited activity. In promulgating rules
under Section 14(e), however, the SEC has distinguished carefully between de-
fining fraud and promulgating rules to prevent fraudulent practices. While the
antitipping provisions in rule 14e-3(d) were promulgated as prophylactic provi-
sions, the basic "disclose or abstain" provisions of rule 14e-3(a) define fraudu-
lent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices.
79
71. Id. § 240.14e-3(a).
72. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
73. See Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37
Bus. LAW. 517, 542 (1982); American Bar Association, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of
Insider Trading, 41 Bus. LAw. 223, 252 (1985); D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 53, at 193-94.
74, See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Sanders v. Thrall Car Mfg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 945, 966-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 730
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1984).
75. 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
76. Id. at 1192.
77. See Heller, supra note 73, at 544-45; see also American Bar Association, supra note 73, at
251-52 ("rule 14e-3 is inconsistent with the fraud rationale of... Chiarella"); D. LANGEVOORT,
supra note 53, at 194-97 (the narrow Chiarella decision is controlled by the "common law restric-
tions on the affirmative duty to disclose").
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
79. This is made clear by the language of the rule itself. Rule 14e-3(d) prohibits tipping in
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Given this framework, the issue is posed whether the SEC has exceeded its
authority under Section 14(e) by defining trading on the basis of undisclosed
information as fraudulent when the trader has no pre-existing duty to speak. It
is clear following Chiarella that fraud for purposes of rule lOb-5 does not include
silence when there is no pre-existing duty to speak. Does Chiarella's definition
of fraud also apply to limit the SEC in defining fraud under its Section 14(e)
authority? For example, when a trader is neither an insider nor a tippee of an
insider, and has not otherwise misappropriated the information, can his failure
to disclose material information-his silence-be a "fraudulent" practice within
the meaning of Section 14(e)? The one court that has ruled on the issue has
upheld the validity of rule 14e-3, but in a rather cryptic opinion. In United
States v. Chestman 8 0 the court offered two rationales for upholding rule 14e-3.
First, the court emphasized that Congress had given greater authority to the
SEC under Section 14(e) than under Section 10(b). That greater authority, how-
ever, was primarily the power to prescribe means to prevent fraud, as well as to
define it-the power which the SEC eschewed in promulgating the disclose or
abstain provisions of Section 14e-3.
81
The Chestman court's second rationale, focusing on congressional intent, is
somewhat more convincing than its first. The court pointed to two pieces of
legislative history. First, it pointed to the legislative history surrounding the
enactment of the 1970 amendments to Section 14(e), which gave the SEC its
rulemaking power under the section.82 An SEC memorandum submitted to the
Senate subcommittee in hearings on the bill described the types of practices that
SEC rulemaking might cover. The memorandum included reference to persons
who trade on undisclosed information about an upcoming tender offer, thereby
giving some support to the promulgation of rule 14e-3.83 Second, in the House
Report on the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,84 the committee recog-
nized rule 14e-3 as one of the existing rules that prohibit insider trading and
which therefore presumably would trigger civil liability under the penalty provi-
sions of that Act.85 Surprisingly, the court did not point to the most convincing
piece of legislative history-the implicit approval of rule 14e-3 in ITSFEA, en-
acted only two months prior to the court's decision.
Section 2 of ITSFEA contains specific Congressional findings. The first of
these findings states:
various tender offer contexts "as a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of section 14(e)" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1989)
(emphasis added). Rule 14e-3(a) provides that "it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or manipu-
lative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e)" to trade without disclosing specified infor-
mation. Id. (emphasis added).
80. 704 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)-3(a) (1989).
82. Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84 Stat. 1497-98 (1970) (adding the last sentence of § 14(e)).
83. 704 F. Supp. at 456-57 (citing Hearings on S. 3431 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970)).
84. For insider trading, the Act generally imposed civil penalties of up to three times profit
gained or loss avoided. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1983).
85. 704 F. Supp. at 457 (citing H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 n.20 (1983)).
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(1) the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act")
governing trading while in possession of material, nonpublic informa-
tion are, as required by such Act, necessary and appropriate for the
Commission to carry out its responsibilities to act in the public interest
and for the protection of investors.
86
In discussing these findings, the House Report on ITSFEA states: "These
findings are intended as an expression of congressional support for these
regulations." 8
7
It seems that this finding was designed, albeit somewhat inartfully, to vali-
date rule 14e-3 as an exercise of SEC rulemaking authority under Section 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act. Section 14(e) grants the SEC rulemaking power
subject to the general limitation in Section 23(a)(1) that its rules be "necessary
or appropriate to implement the provisions" of the Act.88 Congressional lan-
guage in ITSFEA, however, goes beyond a finding that the SEC's insider trading
rules are merely "necessary" or "appropriate". Instead, the finding tracks the
language of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which prohibits the
use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances "in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 89 Never-
theless, the congressional finding in ITSFEA seems designed to validate rule
14e-3. Validation of the insider trading rules promulgated under Section 10(b)
was unnecessary because no question had been raised as to their validity. Rule
14e-3 was one of the few rules as to which any question of validity existed.
Moreover, the language of Congress' statutory finding in ITSFEA, referring to
SEC rules and regulations "governing trading while in possession of material,
nonpublic information" is virtually identical to the language in rule 14e-3(a).
No similar language appears in any of the insider trading rules promulgated
under Section 10(b).
Thus, one important, albeit largely unnoticed, effect of ITSFEA should be
to end further controversy regarding the SEC's authority to promulgate rule
14e-3. In addition, the enactment through ITSFEA of Section 20A of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act, discussed below,90 makes it clear that a private right of ac-
tion is available to contemporaneous purchasers or sellers against persons who
have traded in violation of rule 14e-3. 91
86. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6072.
87. Id.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
90. See infra notes 129-211 and accompanying text.
91. See D. LANGERVOORT, supra note 53, at 265 (discussing the impact of § 20A on private
rights of action under rule 14e-3). Prior to the enactment of ITSFEA, O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), had upheld the existence of such a
cause of action.
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B. Clarification of Civil Penalty Provisions
ITSFEA has clarified pre-existing civil penalty provisions by providing that
all tippers may be liable for civil penalties and specifying the penalty amounts
that may be imposed upon tippers. In 1984, Congress enacted the Insider Trad-
ing Sanctions Act (ITSA)92 which, for the first time, permitted the Commission
to bring an action in federal district court to impose a civil penalty of up to three
times profit gained or loss avoided against persons who violated the Securities
Exchange Act or rules under it by trading in a security while in possession of
material nonpublic information. 93 It similarly permitted an action for imposi-
tion of a civil penalty against any person who aided and abetted illegal trading
by communicating material nonpublic information to a person who traded while
in possession of such information.94 ITSFEA has retained this liability,9 while
modifying the language of newly enacted Section 21A 96 to make clear that tip-
pers may be liable for civil penalties when their tip involves a violation of law,
even if they are not technically aiders and abetters. 97 This change was intended
to insure that the civil penalty provisions were coextensive with the substantive
law of insider trading which imposes independent liability under rule lOb-5 on
tippers.
9 8
ITSFEA and its legislative history also clarify the amount of civil penalties
that may be imposed upon tippers. Section 21A(a)(2) caps the penalty at "three
times the profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase,
sale, or communication." The House Report makes it clear, however, that the
computation of penalties may include profit made (or loss avoided) by both the
direct tippee and the remote tippees of the information as well. 99
92. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984).
93. Id. § 2.
94. Id.
95. ITSFEA renumbered the civil penalty provision to make it § 21A of the Securities Ex-
change Act, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988
Supp.)), and made the penalty provision applicable to actions occurring on or after November 19,
1988. Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 9, 102 Stat. 4684 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1988 Supp.)),
Section 21A(c) gives the SEC authority to exempt either by rule or order any person or transaction,
or class of persons or transactions, from the civil penalty provisions. The exemptions may be either
total or partial, and may be either unconditional or upon specific terms and conditions.
96. Section 21A was added by § 3 of ITSFEA, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 3, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988 Supp.)).
97. Section 21A(d) sets out procedures for collection of civil penalties, basically providing that
the SEC may refer cases to the Department of Justice for collection when the defendant fails to pay
the court-imposed penalty within the time prescribed in the court's order. Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 467 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(d) (1988 Supp.)). It also retains the statute oflimitations of five years after the
purchase or sale which was originally included in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. Id.
The potential implications of Congressional choice of a five-year statute for insider trading cases is
discussed further below. See infra notes 185-211 and accmpanying text.
98. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (Sept. 9, 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6055-56 (citing Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Ber-
ner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985)). Congress saw this as merely clarifying its original intent in enacting the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984. Id. at 19.
99. Id. at 20 n.16 (1988).
C. Civil Penalties For Controlling Persons
ITSFEA generally has expanded the civil penalty provision of the 1984 In-
sider Trading Sanctions Act to cover not only traders and tippers, but also con-
trolling persons who fail to take appropriate steps to prevent potential insider
trading or tipping by their employees. 10° The House Committee described the
reasons for the expansion of civil penalty liability made by ITSFEA as follows:
The Committee intends through the broadening of controlling
person civil penalty liability to increase the economic incentives for
such persons to supervise vigorously their employees. Effective super-
vision of securities firms of their employees and agents is a foundation
of the federal regulatory scheme of investor protection. With respect
to insider trading in particular, the necessity for appropriate supervi-
sion to prevent violations is evident in view of the special opportunities
for abuse in this area.101
ITSFEA uses, but does not define, the term "controlling person." The leg-
islative history of ITSFEA makes clear, however, that Congress intended to
adopt the definition currently used under Section 20(a) of the Securities Ex-
change Act. 102 This definition was summarized as follows in the House Com-
mittee Report on ITSFEA:
"Controlling person" may include not only employers, but any
person with power to influence or control the direction or the manage-
ment, policies, or activities of another person. "Control" is inferred
from possession of such power, whether or not it is exercised. The
Committee expects the Commission and courts to continue to interpret
the term "controlling person" on a case-by-case basis according to the
factual circumstances. 103
For broker-dealer or investment adviser firms which become potentially lia-
ble as controlling persons, ITSFEA imposes mandatory compliance programs.
The firm must "establish, maintain and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature of [its business,] to
prevent the illegal misuse... of material nonpublic information by [the firm] or
by any person associated with [the firm]." 1 4 ITSFEA permits imposition of
civil penalties on the firm as a controlling person if the SEC proves that it
100. ITSFEA precludes liability for the imposition of civil penalties solely because a person em-
ploys a violator, unless the employer meets the criteria in § 21A for controlling person liability.
Securities Exchange Act § 21A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(2) (1988 Supp.).
101. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6043, 6054 (footnote omitted). See Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading
and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 Bus. LAW. 145, 152-64 (1989) (discussion of
provision by House Committee's Minority Counsel). For a criticism of the imposition of treble
damage penalties on'employers, see Aldave, supra note 1, at 908-12.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). Although the definition of "controlling person" is seen as identi-
cal to that in § 20(a), the substantive controlling person provisions and defenses of § 20(a) are made
specifically inapplicable to the insider trading civil penalty provisions. Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 3, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-l(b)(l)-(2) (1988 Supp.)).
103. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6043, 6054 (citations omitted).
104. The required compliance programs are set out in § 15(f) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15
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"knowingly or recklessly failed to establish, maintain, or enforce any policy or
procedures required .... and such failure substantially contributed to or permit-
ted the occurrence of the act or acts constituting the violation."105
While the Act does not set out precise compliance procedures for broker-
dealer and investment advisory firms, the House committee report on ITSFEA
states:
[T]he Committee expects that institutions subject to the require-
ments of this provision will adopt policies and procedures appropriate
to restrict communication pf nonpublic information and to monitor its
dissemination, such as restraining access to files likely to contain such
information; providing continuing education programs concerning in-
sider trading; restricting or monitoring trading in securities relating to
which the firm's employees possess nonpublic information; and vigor-
ously monitoring and reviewing trading for the account of the firm or
of individuals.... [T]he Committee would expect that a firm's supervi-
sory system would include, at a minimum, employment policies such
as those requiring personnel to conduct their securities trading through
in-house accounts or requiring that any trading in outside accounts be
reported expeditiously to the employing firm.106
In addition, ITSFEA gives the SEC authority to promulgate rules requiring
specific compliance policies or procedures for broker-dealer or investment advi-
sory firms. 107
ITSFEA permits civil penalty liability to be imposed upon controlling per-
sons who are not broker-dealers or investment advisers if the SEC establishes
that they "knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that [the] controlled person
was likely to engage in the act or acts constituting the violation and failed to
take appropriate steps to prevent such act or acts before they occurred." 10 8 This
provision creates special problems for employers whose firms are privy to mate-
rial undisclosed information relating to issuers of securities or the market for
securities. Thus, law firms, banks, accounting firms, financial publishers, and
indeed issuers themselves now face the risk of civil penalties unless these firms
adopt measures to control the risk of information misuse by employees. 10 9
U.S.C. § 78o(f) (1988), for registered broker-dealers, and in § 204A of the Investment Advisers Act,
15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (1988 Supp.), for investment advisers.
105. Securities Exchange Act, § 21A(b)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(B) (1988 Supp.). The
House Committee Report states that the causal connection is sufficient if the failure to maintain or
enforce compliance policies or procedures "allowed the violation to occur, or ... provided some
assistance to the controlled person's violations." H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18,
reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6055.
106. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6059.
107. Securities Exchange Act, § 15(f), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(f) (1988 Supp.); Investment Advisers
Act, § 204A, 15 U.S.C.A. § 80b-4a (1988 Supp.).
108. Securities Exchange Act § 21A(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A) (1988 Supp.).
109. Appropriate steps to prevent misuse of inside information will vary depending upon the
firm or business involved. Procedures may include a firm-wide policy statement, procedures to limit
information to persons with a need to know ("Chinese Walls"), and specified prohibitions on trading
activities by employees (for example, restricted lists or watch lists). See Eisenberg, Protecting
Against Insider Trading Liability, 22 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 87 (1989) (discussing proce-
dures to prevent employer liability).
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The potential penalties that may be imposed on controlling persons under
ITSFEA differ to some extent from those penalties that may be imposed upon
the controlled person. While the basic measure is still up to three times profit
gained or loss avoided, in no event may the penalty exceed one million
dollars. 11
0
Furthermore, if the controlled person is a tipper and there are sub-tippees,
liability of the controlling person is premised only upon profit gained or loss
avoided "by the person or persons to whom the controlled person directed such
communication."111 The legislative history clarifies this language. When the
person who has directly received a tip trades, a controlling person is liable for a
penalty based upon the profit gained or loss avoided by the first level tippee.
Should a first level tippee not trade and therefore receive no direct profit, but
rather act as a conduit and pass on the information to others who do trade, the
controlling person is not liable for a penalty based on profit gained or loss
avoided by "the possibly endless chain of persons who may trade on the infor-
mation before it is public." 112 The controlling person is liable only for a penalty
based on profits made or loss avoided by the first level of tippees who do trade.
. Bounty Provisions
Because of the difficulty of detecting insider trading, informants become an
important resource for the government in its attempts to enforce the securities
laws. The House Report on ITSFEA expressly notes the importance of informa-
tion obtained through Ivan Boesky's cooperation with prosecutors to cases
brought in 1986 and 1987.113
In order to encourage informants to come forward, Section 21A(e) permits
the SEC to pay bounties to informants of up to ten percent of the civil penalties
recovered. 114 No bounty may be paid to members, officers, or employees of
federal regulatory agencies, the Department of Justice, or self-regulatory organi-
zations. 115 The House Committee Report also stated that Congress expected
that "bounty payments would not be made to supervisory and compliance of-
ficers of securities firms in situations in which a reward would undermine sub-
stantially the compliance programs within such firms."
'116
The SEC has promulgated rules governing the award of bounties under this
provision.1 17 The rules provide that the SEC has complete discretion regarding
bounty awards and that such determinations are not subject to judicial re-
110. Securities Exchange Act § 21A(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a)(3) (1988 Supp.).
111. Id.
112. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 6043, 6053.
113. Id. at 11-13, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6053.
114. Securities Exchange Act § 21A(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(e) (1988 Supp.). See Kaswell, supra
note 101, at 164-66 (discussing bounty provisions).
115. Id.
116. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6060.
117. Applications for Bounty Awards on Civil Penalties, Exchange Act Release No. 26994, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 84,423 (June 30, 1989) (adopting SEC Rules of Practice, Reg. §§ 201.61-
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view.1 18 Applicants for bounties must file a written application with the SEC
within 180 days after the entry of the court order requiring payment of the pen-
alty subject to the application. 1 9 Generally, applicants for bounties must iden-
tify themselves in their application; however, provision is made for temporary
anonymity if the applicant amends his application to identify himself within the
required 180 day period. 120 Once an applicant has identified himself in an appli-
cation, no guarantees of confidentiality are given. However, absent compelling
cause, the SEC normally does not disclose the identities of confidential sources,
and serious consideration is given to requests for confidentiality. 121
Information regarding insider trading violations may be furnished to the
SEC in any form; however, the Commission encourages persons to furnish it in
writing as soon as possible.122 When the bounty application is not the initial
means by which a person provides information, the application must contain the
dates, times, and means by which the information was provided, the identity of
the SEC staff member to whom it was provided, and, if it was provided anony-
mously, "sufficient further information to confirm that the person filing the ap-
plication is the same person who provided the information to the
Commission." 123 The SEC refuses to authorize any advance offers or promises
of bounties to potential informants.1 24
E. Increases in Criminal Penalties
ITSFEA amends Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
increase the criminal penalties for violations of the Act or rules under it.125 The
amendments increase the maximum fine for natural persons from $100,000 to $1
million and set the maximum fine for entities other than natural persons at $2.5
million.
1 26
ITSFEA also increases the maximum prison sentence from five to ten
years. 127 In making this change, the House Committee Report stated:
The Committee's interest in the maximum jail term is an explicit
201.68, reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 66,221-66,221G). The SEC Office of Public
Affairs has also published a pamphlet entitled "Information on Bounties," SEC 2222 (6-89).
118. Id. at 80,205 (adopting SEC Rules of Practice, Reg. § 201.61, reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCHI) % 66,221).
119. Id. (adopting SEC Rules of Practice, Reg. §§ 201.62-201.63, reprinted in 6 FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CII) t 66,221A- 66,221B).
120. Id. (adopting SEC Rules of Practice, Reg. §§ 201.64-201.65, reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCHI) 66,221C- 66,221D).
121. Id.(reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 84,423, at 80,206 n.5 (June 30, 1989)).
122. Id. 84,423, at 80,205-06.
123. Form of Application and Information Required, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (1989) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. § 201.64).
124. No Promises of Payment, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (1989) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 201.68).
125. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 4,
102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1988 Supp.)). See Kaswell,
supra note 101, at 169-70 (discussing criminal penalty provisions).
126. Under the prior version of § 32(a), enhanced fines applied only to stock exchanges,
127. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 10Q.704, § 4,
102 Stat. 4680 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78if(a) (1988 Supp.)). )
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congressional statement of the heightened seriousness with which in-
sider trading and other securities fraud offenses should be viewed.
Although the legislation does not include an explicit mandatory mini-
mum sentence the Committee believes in the strongest possible manner
that courts should impose jail terms for the commission of these
crimes, and expects that raising the ceiling will increase the certainty
of substantial prison sentences.128
F. Private Actions for Contemporaneous Traders-Explicit and Implicit
Effects
One of the most interesting and potentially far reaching provisions of IT-
SFEA is new Section 20A1 29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The new
section grants a private right of action to contemporaneous purchasers or sellers
of securities against those who tip or trade while in possession of inside informa-
tion. The section, taken with its legislative history, has (1) effectively validated
the misappropriation theory; (2) resolved the conundrum of transactional causa-
tion that plagued the courts in insider trading cases; and (3) provided a strong
argument in favor of judicial application of a uniform five-year statute of limita-
tions to all private rule lOb-5 actions.
1. Validation of the Misappropriation Theory
In 1986 and 1987, particularly as the Carpenter case moved through the
courts, substantial pressure grew for legislation that would define insider trading
clearly.130 The ambiguities created by Chiarella and Dirks, combined with the
fear that the Supreme Court would undercut the validity of the misappropria-
tion theory in Carpenter, led even the SEC to agree reluctantly that definitional
legislation would be appropriate.13
1
In late 1987, however, when an evenly divided Supreme Court affirmed the
application of the misappropriation theory in Carpenter, the critical need for
definition diminished. 132 In enacting ITSFEA, Congress did not include a statu-
128. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6060; cf U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES § 2F1.2 (1988) (insider trading provisions).
129. Section 20A was added by § 5 of ITSFEA, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4680 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988 Supp.)). See Kaswell, supra note 101, at 166-69 (discussing expanded
private rights of action under ITSFEA).
130. See S. Hrg. 100-155, Pts. I & II, Definition of Insider Trading: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); see also D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 53, at ch. 13 (considering three legislative propos-
als for reform of ITSFEA); Symposium: Defining Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REv. 337 (1988)
(collection of articles regarding proposed legislation).
131. Cox Says SEC to Present Own Bill With Definition of Insider Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 939 (June 26, 1987). For discussion and text of SEC bills, see SEC Compromise Propo-
sal on Insider Trading Legislation: Accompanying Letter, and Analysis by Ad Hoc Legislation Com-
mittee, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1817 (Nov. 27, 1987); SEC Submits Compromise Proposal to
Define, Prohibit Insider Trading, 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1783 (Nov. 27, 1987); Text of Draft
"Insider Trading Act of 1987" Submitted by Securities & Exchange Commission, 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1284 (Aug. 14, 1987); SEC Submits Own Proposal to Define Insider Trading, 19 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1239 (Aug. 14, 1987).
132. See SEC to Bring More Insider Trading Cases, But Not for Several Months, Ruder Says, 19
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tory definition of insider trading. The House Committee Report stated:
While cognizant of the importance of providing clear guidelines
for behavior which may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties,
the Committee nevertheless declined to include a statutory definition
in this bill for several reasons. First, the Committee believed that the
court-drawn parameters of insider trading have established clear
guidelines for the vast majority of traditional insider trading cases, and
that a statutory definition could potentially be narrowing, and in an
unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law. Second, the
Committee did not believe that the lack of consensus over the proper
delineation of an insider trading definition should impede progress on
the needed enforcement reforms encompassed within this legislation.
Accordingly, the Committee does not intend to alter the substantive
law with respect to insider trading with this legislation. The legal prin-
ciples governing insider trading cases are well-established and widely-
known.
133
Despite this disclaimer, ITSFEA, when taken with its legislative history,
did move toward a definition of insider trading. In particular, it confirmed the
validity of the misappropriation theory. The House Committee Report, in dis-
cussing the Carpenter case, stated:
Thus the misappropriation theory clearly remains valid in the Sec-
ond Circuit,... but is unresolved nationally. In the view of the Com-
mittee, however, this type of security fraud should be encompassed
within Section 10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act] and Rule lOb-
5.134
Similarly, in explaining Section 20A, the House Committee stated:
[T]he codification of a right of action for contemporaneous trad-
ers is specifically intended to overturn court cases which have pre-
cluded recovery for plaintiffs where the defendant's violation is
premised upon the misappropriation theory. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan
Stanley, 719 F. 2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983). 1
35
This legislative history leaves little doubt as to the validity of the misappro-
priation theory which imposes rule lOb-5 liability upon outsiders who trade
while in possession of information which they have wrongfully acquired.1 36 The
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1923, 1924 (Dec. 18, 1987) (views of Securities Industry Association
President Edward I. O'Brien); see also D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 53, at 393 (views expressed to
Senate subcommittee questioning need for legislation).
133. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6043, 6048. See Kaswell, supra note 101, at 150-51 (discussing decision to exclude
definition of insider trading).
134. Id. at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6047.
135. Id. at 26, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6063. In Moss, the court
had also dismissed plaintiff's civil RICO claim because the dismissal of the rule 10b-5 claims had
undercut plaintiff's allegation of securities fraud as predicate offenses constituting a pattern of racke-
teering activity. Moss, 719 F.2d at 17-20. This holding, which was problematic even under prior
law, was presumably also overturned by the enactment of Section 20A as to RICO claims by con-
temperaneous traders.
136. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text (discussing development of the misappropria-
tion theory).
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exact parameters of misappropriation may, however, remain open to some dis-
pute. In particular, questions of a person's pre-existing duty not to take infor-
mation for his own use may arise.
137
2. Transactional Causation In Rule lOb-5 Cases
The judicial development of private rights of action against those trading on
stock exchanges and in other impersonal markets while in possession of inside
information, prior to the enactment of ITSFEA, proceeded without legislative
guidance on two crucial issues: (1) which investors have standing to sue in a
market in which privity between purchasers and sellers is difficult to estab-
lish; 138 and (2) are damages in such cases to be primarily compensatory or pri-
marily directed toward deterrence of insider trading? In enacting Section 20A
of the Securities Exchange Act to address these issues, Congress focused primar-
ily on the law as developed in the Second Circuit and adopted the Second Cir-
cuit's general rule on private damage actions in traditional insider trading and
tipping cases; as discussed above, however, Congress rejected the Second Cir-
cuit's rule that denied private rights of action in misappropriation cases. By
focusing almost solely on Second Circuit precedents, Congress may not have
realized that it was changing the law in traditional insider trading cases in other
jurisdictions as well.
139
Prior to ITSFEA, when insider trading occurred on a stock exchange or
otherwise in impersonal securities markets, identifying the injury caused by the
violation of law and the amount of damages suffered was difficult. The difficulty
arose from both theoretical and practical considerations.
On a theoretical basis, it has generally been held that one element of a suc-
cessful rule lOb-5 claim is transactional causation-the violation of law must be
a substantial factor in the plaintiff's decision to enter the transaction in ques-
tion. 1 40 In rule lOb-5 claims involving not insider trading, but rather affirmative
misstatements or half-truths, transactional causation is satisfied by showing reli-
ance upon the inaccurate information furnished, or at least indirect reliance
upon such information through reliance upon the integrity of the price of the
stock as reflected in a well-developed market.141 In rule lOb-5 insider trading
cases, however, the violation occurs through trading in the face of total silence;
traditional reliance is absent. Plaintiff did not base the decision to purchase or
137. See D. LANGEVOORT, supra note 53, at 394-96 (raising the issue and suggesting that wrong-
fulness be defined as "use of information directly or indirectly in violation of a reasonable expecta-
tion of confidentiality").
138. See generally Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Mar-
kets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 1Ob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217
(1981) (discussing which investors should have a cause of action against insiders who trade without
disclosing material information).
139. The major case taking a different position was Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977), discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 175-
77.
140. "[R]eliance is an element of a Rule lob-5 cause of action.... Reliance provides the requi-
site causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury." Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988).
141. See id. at 988-92.
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sell his stock upon anything that defendant did or said; rather, his decision
merely might have been different if defendant had spoken. Thus, causation can
be established only by showing that plaintiff would not have purchased or sold,
at least not at the same price, had he known the relevant inside information.
4 2
Yet rule lOb-5 insider trading violations do not occur by nondisclosure
alone, but rather by trading coupled with nondisclosure.143 Even without trad-
ing by insiders, many investors would have acted differently had they known the
truth. How does one distinguish that vast group who have no right to expect
market prices to reflect inside information 144 from those who are injured in ad-
dition by the insider trading? The most direct answer to this is that any losses
which the former group suffers have been caused by perfectly legal market activ-
ity, not by the illegal conduct of an insider. Thus, investors who trade during
periods of nondisclosure alone have no claim because rule lOb-5 has not been
violated.
Once the insider trades without disclosing material information, however, a
rule lOb-5 violation has occurred. The question then becomes: Which transac-
tions are causally related to that trading so as to give rise to a cause of action?
In the most literal sense, the insider has caused a purchase or sale by persons
who accidentally are in direct privity with him as a result of their transactions in
an impersonal market. The injury suffered by those in direct privity, however, is
difficult to distinguish from the injury suffered by everyone else trading on an
impersonal market at the same time.
Thus, three groups of injured investors may be identified when material
information has not been disclosed. First are those who trade during periods of
nondisclosure of inside information, but in which no trading by the insider oc-
curs. These investors have no cause of action because no one has violated rule
lOb-5. A second class includes those investors who purchase from or sell to an
insider during a period in which that insider has not disclosed material informa-
tion. These investors have the strongest claim for relief since a violation of rule
lOb-5 has occurred and their purchase or sale was caused by the insider's illegal
trading. But early on, the courts refused to limit relief under rule lOb-5 to those
with actual privity. 14 5 Third are those who buy or sell during a period of non-
disclosure which is coupled with insider trading, but who buy or sell from third
persons equally ignorant of the undisclosed information. These investors have a
142. In non-insider trading cases under rule lOb-5 involving primarily the breach of a duty to
disclose, proof that the withheld information was material is sufficient to create at least a rebuttable
presumption of reliance. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972).
143. "[A]n insider will be liable under Rule lOb-5 for inside trading only where he fails to dis-
close material nonpublic information before trading on it and thus makes 'secret profits.'" Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983).
144. "It is the cqmbination of the tip and the tippee's trading that poses the evil against which
the open market investor must be protected .... If the insider chooses not to trade,... no injury
may be claimed by the outside investor, since the public has no right to the undisclosed informa-
tion." Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 1980).
145. "ITihe common law requirement of privity has all but vanished from lOb-5 proceedings




more problematic claim for relief. A violation of rule lOb-5 has occurred, as it
has for the second class of investors defined above. But their injuries seem no
more causally related to the insider's trading than do the pre-insider trading
injuries of investors in the first class.
The case law developed in the Second Circuit largely failed to address these
theoretical complexities of transactional causation, and instead merely articu-
lated a rule that contemporaneous traders-that is, all those who traded during
the same period that defendants traded or recommended trading-may recover
damages. 146 But why were the injuries of those contemporaneous traders who
were not in privity with insiders caused by the insiders' illicit trading as opposed
merely to their nondisclosure?
The best theoretical justification for a rule permitting standing for contem-
poraneous traders who were not in privity with the insider or his tippee was
articulated not in the Second Circuit, but rather by Judge Celebrezze of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in his concurring opinion in Fridrich v. Brad-
ford.147 According to Judge Celebrezze, contemporaneous traders are "surro-
gate plaintiffs" for those actually in privity. 14s The difficulty of post hoc
matching of buyers and sellers on impersonal markets requires such stand-in
plaintiffs in order to accomplish the deterrent purposes of rule lOb-5.
14 9
This deterrent effect rationale also supports the other portion of the Second
Circuit's traditional approach to private damages actions for insider trading-
the limitation of damages to the profit gained or loss avoided by the defendant or
his tippees. 150 Under this rationale, surrogate plaintiffs are granted standing not
primarily to obtain compensation for their losses, but in order to impose a deter-
rent on insider trading that would be lost if insiders could escape liability by
reason of the impossibility of finding those in privity with them. As Judge Cele-
brezze remarked: "[A]n insider should not escape civil liability for conduct
which would clearly violate rule lOb-5... by the simple expedient of restricting
his trading to the open market where the mechanics of the marketplace make it
difficult, if not impossible, to trace particular transactions." 151 Compensation is
less important for stand-in plaintiffs, because they were not actually victims of
insider trading in the first place.
152
In addition to this theoretical justification for placing a ceiling on damage
awards to surrogate plaintiffs, a practical concern in insider trading cases was
146. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238 (2d Cir. 1974).
147. 542 F.2d 307, 323-27 (6th Cir. 1976) (Celebrezze, J., concurring), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977). For discussion of the majority opinion in Fridrich, see infra text accompanying notes
175-77. Judge Celebreeze concurred in the court's decision in favor of the defendants because plain-
tiffs here were not contemporaneous traders. Id. at 327 (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 326 n. II (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
149. Id. (Celebrezze, J., concurring).
150. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980) (limiting plaintiff's
total recovery to gain realized by tippee from inside information).
151. Fridrich, 542 F.2d at 323-24 (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
152. See Note, Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule lob-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 72
MIcH. L. REV. 1398, 1429-30 (1974) (suggesting remedies that focus on deterrence rather than
compensation).
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the potentially draconian nature of damages. Even liability limited to contem-
poraneous traders may be substantially out of proportion to the wrong commit-
ted by the defendant. 153 For this reason, the Second Circuit in Elkind v. Liggett
& Myers, Inc. 154 limited damages to disgorgement of profits. 155
Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as added by ITSFEA,
has in general codified the Second Circuit's judicial standards by creating an
express cause of action, with a cap on damages, for contemporaneous traders.
Under the legislation, any person who violates any provision of the 1934 Act, or
rules promulgated under it, by purchasing or selling securities while in posses-
sion of material, nonpublic information is liable to persons who traded contem-
poraneously.1 56 Tippers are jointly and severally liable with, and to the same
extent as, the person to whom they communicated their tip, either directly or
through a conduit.1 57 That is, tippers are liable to the same extent as the first
level of tippee who trades, but are not liable for the profits made by sub-tip-
pees.158 The total amount of damages imposed on traders and tippers, however,
may not exceed the profit gained or loss avoided in the transactions that are the
subject of the violation.1 59 Section 20A does not define "profit gained or loss
avoided," 160 but presumably it was intended to have the same meaning as set
out in Section 21A(f) 161 for purposes of civil penalty provisions and as devel-
oped in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. 162 According to the Second Circuit,
civil peialties should be assessed as the difference between the purchase or sale
price of the security and the value of the security as measured by its trading
price a reasonable period after public dissemination of the nonpublic informa-
tion. 163 Furthermore, any amounts disgorged in an SEC injunction action relat-
153. Logic would compel application of the theory to a case where a tippee sells only 10
shares of a heavily traded stock (e.g., IBM), which then drops substantially when the
tipped information is publicly disclosed. To hold the tipper and tippee liable for the losses
suffered by every open market buyer of the stock as a result of the later decline in value of
the stock after the news became public would be grossly unfair.
Elkind, 635 F.2d at 170.
154. 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980).
155. A similar measure of damages was recommended by the American Law Institute. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1708 (1980).
156. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
§ 20A(a), 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988 Supp.)).
157. Id.
158. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 & n.16 (1988), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6046-47 & n. 16.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(1) (1988 Supp.). Controlling persons are subject to liability under the
general controlling person provisions of Securities Exchange Act § 20a, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982),
but are not otherwise liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the good faith and non-
inducement defense of § 20(a) is proven. Id.
160. This failure to define profit gained or loss avoided for purposes of § 20A again reflects
Congress' focus upon adoption of the law of the Second Circuit. The measure of damages had been
definitively worked out in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). Congress
was largely satisfied with that. See supra text accompanying note 134. Its main focus was to reverse
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984),seesupra note
134 and accompanying text, and create a private right of action in misappropriation cases.
161. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4679 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988 Supp.)).
162. 635 F.2d 156, 172 (2d Cir. 1980).
163. Id.
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ing to the transaction are deducted from the amount that may be recovered as
damages under Section 20A.164
The statutory language of ITSFEA also failed to define specifically "con-
temporaneous trading." The House Committee Report, however, made it clear
that case law had defined the term, specifically citing three Second Circuit
cases. 165 The first, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
166
established the basic proposition that liability runs to plaintiffs who traded "dur-
ing the same period" that defendants engaged in insider trading or tipping.
1 67
The second, Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp.,168 held that liability
does not run to everyone who traded between the time defendants began trading
and the time the material information was finally disclosed. 169 The court distin-
guished Shapiro, noting that everyone who traded during that period was per-
mitted to recover because only four days elapsed until disclosure.170 In Wilson,
however, when plaintiff's purchases occurred a full month after defendant's
sales, the court denied recovery, stating that "[t]o extend the period of liability
well beyond the time of the insider's trading simply because disclosure was never
made could make the insider liable to all the world."' 171 The third case focused
on the other end of the spectrum. O'Connor & Associates v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. 172 held that liability does not run to plaintiffs who trade prior to trad-
ing by the insider or his tippees, even when only a few hours separate the
trades.173 Consequently, the court further held that a nontrading tipper's liabil-
ity extends only to those who trade after his tippees begin to trade. 174
Congress' adoption of Second Circuit law necessarily rejects alternative po-
sitions on causation developed outside of that Circuit. In particular, the Sixth
Circuit in Fridrich v. Bradford 175 had taken a narrower view of standing to
recover in open market insider trading cases. The majority of the court in
164. 15 U.S.C.A. § 20A(b)(2) (1988 Supp.). This occurs even if the disgorged funds have not
been paid to the particular plaintiffs in the § 20A action, thus emphasizing the deterrent, rather than
compensatory, nature of the cause of action under § 20A. Id.
Some ambiguity exists under § 20A(b)(2) regarding the appropriate measure of damages if,
instead of the typical class action, separate suits are filed by several contemporaneous traders. Ar-
guably the language of the section could be read to permit multiple judgments for disgorgement.
Both the underlying rationale for the section and the House Committee Report on ITSFEA suggest,
to the contrary, however, that the section is intended to limit to profits gained or loss avoided the
total amount awarded to all contemporaneous traders, regardless of whether one or several actions
are involved. See H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6064 n.22.
165. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 n.22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6064 n.22; see generally Wang, The "Contemporaneous" Traders
Who Can Sue An Inside Trader, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 1175 (1987) (discussing case law defining con-
temporaneous trading).
166. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
167. Id. at 241.
168. 648 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1981).
169. Id. at 94-95.
170. Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 232; see Wilson, 648 F.2d at 94 (discussing this aspect of Shapiro).
171. Wilson, 648 F.2d at 94.
172. 559 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
173. Id. at 803.
174. Id. at 803 n.4.
175. 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
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Fridrich rejected the rationale of Shapiro 176 and required instead that a plaintiff
show either that he had purchased securities from or sold them to the defendant,
or that defendant's acts of trading in some other way affected plaintiff's decision
to buy or sell. 177 Only such plaintiffs could show a causal connection between
their losses and defendants' violations, that is, defendants' trading without dis-
closure of material nonpublic information. Other potential plaintiffs were in-
jured only by the nondisclosure; defendants' trading added nothing to their
injury.
This alternative notion of causation developed in Fridrich retains impor-
tance even after the enactment of ITSFEA. As previously discussed, Section
20A restricts contemporaneous trading cases to a disgorgement measure of dam-
ages. 178 However, Section 20A(d) provides that the section shall not be con-
strued to limit or condition the right of any person to bring suit to enforce a
requirement of the Securities Exchange Act or to limit or condition the availabil-
ity of any implied right of action under the Act.179 The House Committee Re-
port explains this provision in part as follows:
The Committee recognizes that where the plaintiff demonstrates
that he was defrauded by the defendant's insider trading and suffered
actual damages proximately caused by the defendant's behavior, a cap
of profit gained or loss avoided by the defendant, which is applicable
for actions by contemporaneous traders, is not appropriate. Rather, in
such an implied private cause of action, the plaintiff should be able to
recover the full extent of those actual damages. 180
Thus, Congress seems to acknowledge that the limitation of damages to
disgorgement applies only to surrogate plaintiffs who have no true claim for
compensatory relief against the inside trader or tipper. Plaintiffs who demon-
strate the kind of true transactional causation described in Fridrich v. Brad-
ford '81 are apparently not limited to disgorgement. Such a conclusion seems to
modify the broad pre-ITSFEA statement of the rule regarding a cap on dam-
ages, articulated in the Second Circuit by Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. 182
It is not clear that Congress understood all of these implications. Legisla-
tive history reveals that the main focus of this savings clause was Congress' con-
cern about application of a disgorgement measure of damages in a peculiar type
of misappropriation case-the case in which the victim of the misappropriation
was also injured by trading in the securities involved. The House Committee
176. Id. at 318-19 & 318 n.23.
177. Id. at 318-19.
178. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1988 Supp.). However, the House Committee deleted a proposed
provision that would have affirmatively granted a private right of action, without a damage cap, to
persons who could prove injuries actually caused by violations of rule lOb-5. This largely left to
judicial development the articulation of the limits of recovery in actions by nonsurrogate plaintiffs.
Kaswell, supra note 101, at 167-69. That judicial development must, of course, take account of the
implications of the savings clause which was included in Section 20A(d).
180. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6043.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 175-77.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 153-55 (discussing the Elkind rule).
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Report focused on Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. v. Thayer,183 in which an
Anheuser-Busch director allegedly misappropriated information regarding
Anheuser-Busch's upcoming tender offer for shares of Campbell Taggart, Inc.
which tippees used to purchase stock of Campbell Taggart. Anheuser-Busch al-
leged that it was the victim of the wrongful misappropriation because tippee
trading inflated the price of Campbell Taggart shares, causing Anheuser-Busch
to pay $80 million more than it otherwise would have paid in its tender offer. In
focusing on this case, the House Committee concluded that when the plaintiff
can prove it suffered injury as a result of the defendant's insider trading, neither
the contemporaneous trading requirement nor the limitation of damages to a
disgorgement measure applies.
184
3. Statute of Limitations
ITSFEA imposes a five-year statute of limitations on private actions
brought by contemporaneous traders under Section 20A.18 5 This limitation
period in Section 20A(b)(4) runs from "the date of the last transaction that is the
subject of the violation."' 186 ITSFEA similarly retains a five-year limitation pe-
riod in Section 21A(d)(5) for SEC actions seeking civil penalties for insider trad-
ing. 187 Because of contemporaneous judicial developments, the adoption of a
five-year limitation period for these types of insider trading cases, while seem-
ingly unremarkable, potentially has important implications for the use of rule
lOb-5 outside the insider trading area.
As with many federal civil causes of action, no explicit statute of limitations
applies to private civil actions under rule lOb-5.18 8 Courts, therefore, have been
required to determine the appropriate limitation period to apply. Until recently,
relying largely upon the supposed intent of Congress,189 the universally accepted
principle has been that courts should apply the most analogous statute of limita-
tions of the state in which the court sits. 190
183. No. CA3-85-0794-R (N.D. Tex. 1986).
184. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6045. For other cases posing issues similar to those in Anheuser-Busch, see
FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 673 F. Supp. 242 (N.D. Ill. 1987), rev'd, 852 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1988); Litton
Indus. Inc. v. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No. 86 Civ. 6447 (S.D.N.Y.) discussed in L.
SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 1297-98 (2d ed.
1988)).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988 Supp.).
186. Id. § 78t-l(b)(4).
187. Id. § 78u-l(d)(5).
188. Where express private rights of action were created by the Securities Exchange Act, limita-
tions periods were also imposed. Eg., § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988) (one year after discovery and
three years after the violation); § 16(b), id. § 78(p)(b) (two years after profit realized); § 18(c), id.
§ 78r(c) (one year after discovery or three years after accrual); and § 29(b), id. § 78cc(b) (one year
after discovery or three years after violation). However, no general limitations period was created to
apply to implied private rights of action such as those under rule lOb-5.
189. For a historical development of the principles that resulted in the application of state limita-
tion periods to federal causes of action when no explicit federal statute of limitations exists, see
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 157-65 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
190. E.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384 n.18 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976). See generally 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRAC-
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Two important concerns arise when this traditional approach is applied to
rule 10b-5 cases. First, the approach creates a lack of uniformity, 1 91 making
forum shopping a realistic possibility, 192 particularly in light of the broad venue
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.193 Second, applicable state statutes
of limitation are typically longer than limitation periods under the express an-
tifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.1 94 Therefore, rule IOb-5 often
becomes the cause of action of choice when the limitation period has run on the
more easily proven causes of action otherwise available, for example, causes of
action under either Section 11 or 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.195
In recent years, the Supreme Court has signaled a change in the traditional
doctrine that always required application of state limitation periods to federal
claims in the absence of an express federal limitation provision. Instead, the
Court has been willing to borrow an analogous federal limitations period when
the analogous state statutes would be "unsatisfactory vehicles for the enforce-
ment of federal law."196 The need for a uniform limitation period for a particu-
lar federal cause of action may encourage borrowing of a single federal statute
rather than diverse state statutes of limitation.
1 97
These considerations led the Third Circuit in In re Data Access Systems
Securities Litigation1 98 to select a uniform federal statute of limitations for rule
lOb-5 actions. The Third Circuit chose the limitation period prescribed in sev-
eral provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934199 that created express
private rights of action--one year after the plaintiff discovers the facts constitut-
TICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 235.02 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing use of state statutes of limitation, prin-
ciples governing choice of applicable statute, and exceptions to these principles).
191. See L, Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 994-96 (2d ed. 1988); Schul-
man, Statutes of Limitation in lob-5 Actions. Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV.
635, 642-43 (1967).
192. Bloomenthal, The Statute of Limitations and Rule lOb-S Claims: A Study in Judicial Lassi-
tude, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 235, 271 (1989).
193. Securities Exchange Act, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988 Supp.), gives exclusive jurisdiction to
federal courts and permits suit to be brought in "any district wherein any act or transaction consti-
tuting the violation occurred," or in any "district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business." Id. Process may be served anywhere in the world that the "defendant may
be found." Id.
194. For a compilation of the analogous state statute for each state, see 5C A. JACOBS, supra
note 190, at § 235.02 (state statutes of limitation range from one year to ten years, with two-, three-
and six-year statutes predominating).
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1988 Supp.). See, ag., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 387 (1983) ("availability of an express remedy under § 11 of the 1933 Act does not pre-
clude defrauded purchasers of registered securities from maintaining [a rule lOb-5] action").
196. DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 161 (1983). See generally
Bloomenthal, supra note 192, at 235-97 (discussing application of uniform federal statute of
limitations).
197. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., 483 U.S, 143, 153-54 (1987) (uniform
limitation period for civil RICO actions).
198. 843 F.2d 1537, 1548-49 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988); see Note, In re Data
Access Systems Securities Litigation: Finally A Step Towards Uniformity in JOb-5 Statute of Limita-
tions Disputes, 40 MERCER L. REV. 1045 (1989) (discussing background to and holding of Data
Access decision); see also Bernstein v. Crazy Eddie, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 962, 980-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(adopting the Data Access holding).
199. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78i(e) (1988); § 18(c), id. § 78r(c);
§ 29(b), id. § 78(b).
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ing the violation, and in no event more than three years after the violation.2° °
This limitation period also is substantially similar to the limitation period in
Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933 for actions brought under Sections 11
and 12(2) of that Act.201 Adoption of this limitation period thus may reduce
substantially the attractiveness of rule lOb-5 as the basis for a cause of action by
defrauded purchasers of securities, since, except for the statute of limitations
period, other elements of a cause of action are often easier for a plaintiff to prove
under Sections 11 and 12(2).2
0 2
Adoption of a uniform federal limitations period for rule lob-5 actions need
not, however, continue to make rule lOb-5 so unattractive an option for de-
frauded investors. Data Access was decided prior to the enactment of ITSFEA.
Congress' adoption of a five-year limitation period in ITSFEA for insider trad-
ing cases provides a strong argument that this five-year period is now the most
analogous limitation period for all claims under rule lOb-5. 20 3 One lower court
decision has rejected this argument, however, finding that there is not a persua-
sive analogy between the five-year limitation period for insider trading cases and
rule lOb-5 cases that are not related to insider trading or misappropriation of
information. 204 The case is currently on appeal. 20 5
The five year limitation period was first adopted in the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984 as to actions for civil penalties.20 6 ITSFEA carried the
provision over into Section 20A's private action for damages by contemporane-
ous traders. 20 7 In each, Congress was certainly focusing upon insider trading
rather than more broadly upon rule lOb-5. However, adoption of the limitation
period of Data Access 20 8 in other rule lOb-5 cases would impose a statute of
limitations shorter than that typically imposed through the current rule of bor-
rowing of analogous state statutes. Currently, applicable state statutes range
from one to ten years, with two-, three-, and six-year statutes predominating.
20 9
If any Congressional intent seems clear in recent years, it is to expand rather
than restrict remedies for securities fraud.2 10 Borrowing the five-year statute in
200. Data Access, 843 F.2d at 1545-46, 1550.
201. Securities Exchange Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982).
202. See 5 A. JAcoBs, supra note 190, at § 3.01 (discussing elements of claims under various
securities law provisions).
203. See SEC Says 1TSFEA Limitations Period Should be Applied to Rule 10b-5 Claims, 21 See.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 875 (June 16, 1989) (discussing SEC's amicus brief in Lebman v. Aktiebola-
get Electrolux, No. 88-1114 (U.S. June 15, 1989), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 3214 (1989)).
204. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 714 F. Supp. 679, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
205. See SEC Urges Five-Year Limitations Period for Fraud Actions, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
No. 1354, at 3 (Sept. 6, 1989).
206. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264, 1264-65.
207. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677, 4681 (1988) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4) (1988 Supp.)).
208. See supra text accompanying notes 199-203.
209. See SC A. JACOBS, supra note 190, at § 235.02 (compiling analogous state statutes for each
state).
210. This is reflected by enactment of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
376, 98 Stat. 1264 and ITSFEA, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988). The House Report on
ITSFEA stated: "In the view of the Committee, the present enforcement framework should be
strengthened to curtail continuing insider trading and other market abuses." H.R. REP. No. 910,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6043, 6044.
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ITSFEA would permit courts to achieve the important goal of national uniform-
ity and the concomitant prevention of forum shopping while not substantially
restricting the existing availability of rule lOb-5.211
G. Investigatory Assistance to Foreign Securities Authorities
As part of the SEC's increasing cooperation with foreign governments and
foreign securities regulatory agencies, ITSFEA added Section 21(a)(2) to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.212 This section permits the SEC to provide
investigatory assistance to foreign securities authorities.
213
The section provides that:
[on] request from a foreign securities authority, the [SEC] may provide
assistance... if the requesting authority states that [it] is conducting
an investigation which it deems necessary to determine whether any
person has violated, is violating, or is about to violate any laws or rules
relating to securities matters that [it] administers or enforces. [In pro-
viding such assistance, the SEC may] conduct such investigation as [it]
deems necessary to collect [pertinent] information and evidence.
214
The House Committee Report on ITSFEA states that in order to protect against
assisting "in an unfocused or unbounded foreign investigation, it is expected that
a foreign authority seeking assistance [will include in its request] the facts which
constitute a potential violation of its laws."'215  Section 21(a)(2) states that
"[SEC] assistance may be provided without regard to whether the facts stated in
the request would also constitute a violation of the laws of the United States."
216
The legislative history makes it clear that the SEC may issue a formal order of
private investigation and issue and enforce subpoenas in connection with this
investigation, 217 a power which it previously had only when investigating viola-
tions or potential violations of United States law, or of rules of United States
self-regulatory organizations. 218 Congress intended that the same protections
and remedies as in purely domestic investigations be available to witnesses in
t
211. The SEC, urging adoption of ITSFEA's five-year limitations period in private rule lob-5
actions, argued in its amicus brief to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ceres Partners v. GEL
Assocs that the one-/three- year limitations period chosen in Data Access was "devised for [causes of
action] that generally give plaintiffs litigation advantages that they do not enjoy under Rule 10b5."
SEC Urges Five-YearLimitations Periodfor Fraud Actions, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1354, at 3-4
(Sept. 6, 1989).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (1988 Supp.). See Kaswell, supra note 101, at 171-75 (discussing SEC
assistance to foreign securities authorities).
213. Additional legislation to enhance international securities enforcement cooperation is pend-
ing in Congress. See House Approves SEC-Drafted Bill to Limit Access to Foreign Documents, 21 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1463 (Sept. 29, 1989) (discussing proposed International Securities Enforce-
ment Cooperation Act of 1989). See generally Levine & Callcott, The SEC and Foreign Policy: The
International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1988, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 115 (1989) (discuss-
ing proposals to enhance international enforcement cooperation).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (1988 Supp.).
215. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6043, 6066.
216. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(2) (1988 Supp.).
217. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6043, 6066.
218. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(l) (1988 Supp.).
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investigations for foreign authorities. 2 19
Section 21(a)(2) requires the SEC to consider, in deciding whether to pro-
vide investigatory assistance, "whether [the foreign securities] authority has
agreed to provide reciprocal assistance in securities matters to the [SEC]" and
whether investigatory assistance "would prejudice the public interest of the
United States."
'220
The term "foreign securities authority" is broadly defined in new Section
3(a)(50) of the Act 22 1 to mean "any foreign government, or any governmental
body or regulatory organization empowered by a foreign government to admin-
ister or enforce its [securities] laws."
'222
In a related provision of ITSFEA, Congress appropriated funds for mem-
bership fees and official expenditures for the SEC's participation in the Interna-
tional Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSC).
22 3
H. Laying the Groundwork for Further Legislation
ITSFEA contains two separate provisions regarding recommendations for
possible additional legislation. The narrower of the two studies called upon the
Commission to submit to Congress within sixty days of the enactment of IT-
SFEA recommendations with respect to extending the SEC's "authority to seek
civil penalties or impose administrative fines for violations other than [of the
insider trading provisions.]" 224 This provison was directed at legislative propos-
als growing out of the already-completed Report of the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting which had been chaired by former SEC Com-
missioner James C. Treadway, Jr.225 In response to this, in January 1989, the
SEC submitted extensive recommendations in its proposed Securities Law En-
forcement Remedies Act of 1989.226 This proposal would permit assessment of
new civil penalties in both judicial and administrative proceedings, would permit
both judicial and administrative orders prohibiting service as an officer or direc-
tor of any reporting company, and would permit administrative enforcement of
insider trading reporting requirements of Securities Exchange Act Section
16(a).
2 2 7
The broader provision of ITSFEA is that found in Section 7 which autho-
rizes, subject to sufficient appropriations, a broad study and investigation of the
adequacy of the federal securities laws, including issues of insider trading, sur-
219. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6043, 6066.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1988 Supp.).
221. Id. § 78c(a)(50).
222. Id. § 78u(a).
223. Id. § 78kk. See Kaswell, supra note 101, at 179 (Committee on Appropriations had been
reluctant to appropriate funds without specific authorization).
224. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
§ 3(c), 102 Stat. 4677, 4680 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1, § 1 (1988 Supp.)).
225. Kaswell, supra note 101, at 171.
226. Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1989, [1988-89 Trans. Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) t 84,350.
227. Id.
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veillance mechanisms, intergovernmental cooperation in enforcement, and "im-
pediments to the fairness and orderliness of the securities markets and to
improvements in the breadth and depth of the capital available to the securities
markets." 228
III. CONCLUSION
ITSFEA is a piecemeal, but pragmatic, response to the perceived growth of
insider trading in an internationalized securities market. In enacting it, Con-
gress dismissed the academic arguments that favor insider trading, with a nod
toward the less cerebral and more visceral reaction of the public to the seeming
unfairness of insider trading. The House Report summarized the congressional
reasoning thusly:
A modest number of economists and academics defend the prac-
tice of insider trading as promoting an efficient market .... But the
far greater number of commentators support efforts to curb insider
trading, viewing such efforts as crucial to the capital formation process
that depends on investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of our
securities markets.
229
Also, as discussed, proper consideration of the background and legislative
history of ITSFEA may affect judicial resolution of various long-standing securi-
ties law issues.
ITSFEA is certainly not the last word on reform in the rapidly changing
capital markets of the late twentieth century. Legislative recommendations al-
ready submitted to Congress and the new special study authorized by ITSFEA
may lay the groundwork for even more extensive changes in the near future.
228. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 7,
102 Stat. 4677, 4682 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988 Supp.)). See Kaswell, supra note 101, at 176-
79 (discussing ITSFEA provisions authorizing a new special study of securities law issues). For
proposals regarding the scope of this study, see Sporkin, US. Financial and Securities Markets
Under Stress-Some Thoughtsfor Reform, Toledo Transcript, Spring 1989, at 17; Cohen, A Quarter-
Century of Market Developments- What Should a New "Special Study" Study?, 45 Bus. LAw. 3
(1989).
229. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 6043, 6045.
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